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Abstract 
I argue against the claim that it is trivial to state that Sidgwick used the method of wide reflective equilibrium. This 
claim is based on what could be called the Triviality Charge, which is pressed against the method of wide reflective 
equilibrium by Peter Singer. According to this charge, there is no alternative to using the method if it is interpreted 
as involving all relevant philosophical background arguments. The main argument against the Triviality Charge is 
that although the method of wide reflective equilibrium is compatible with coherentism (understood as a form of 
weak foundationalism) as well as moderate foundationalism, it is not compatible with strong foundationalism. 
Hence, the claim that a philosopher uses the method of wide reflective equilibrium is informative. In particular, 
this is true with regard to Sidgwick. 
Introduction 
This paper contributes to the debate whether Sidgwick used the method of reflective equi-
librium. “Reflective equilibrium” is the name of the method of justification which John Rawls 
suggests in his A Theory of Justice (1971). He claims that many other philosophers have used 
the method even before: Most prominently Nelson Goodman in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast 
(1955) and Henry Sidgwick in The Methods of Ethics (1907). Whereas Catherine Elgin – a 
scholar sympathetic to Goodman – endorsed Rawls’s suggestion and even worked out a 
better understanding of the methodology, from the very beginning there was a dispute over 
the claim that Sidgwick employed such a method. I argue that Rawls’s claim that Sidgwick 
used the method can be – in some sense – defended against certain strong criticisms. 
The following is divided into three parts. In the first part of this paper, I will provide some 
important background information: I will do that by referring to an article by Peter Singer 
published 1974 entitled “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium” in which he argued that re-
flective equilibrium is neither an adequate method of justification nor the method Sidgwick 
did employ. I will reconstruct Singer’s interpretation of Sidgwick and his argumentation 
against Rawls’s claim. 
This sets the ground for the second part. I will begin by sketching the reasons why Singer 
slightly revised his earlier criticism of the method of reflective equilibrium in his latest 
works. After considering the now predominant wide interpretation of the method Singer 
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now holds that it is indeed possible to claim that Sidgwick used it – but he still would refrain 
from saying so, because of one more charge he presses against the method and the claim: 
the charge that if it is understood in the wide sense, it is simply trivial to state that a philos-
opher makes use of it. According to the charge there is no alternative to the method of 
reflective equilibrium, if it is interpreted in such a wide way that its use involves all relevant 
philosophical background arguments, because then it includes all other rival methods. So, 
to state that someone uses the method settles nothing and is pointless. This is what I 
dubbed the Triviality Charge.1 
In part three I will assume that the wide interpretation of the method of reflective equilib-
rium, which Singer considers compatible with the method of Sidgwick, is the only plausible 
interpretation. I will argue that it is – even in the wide interpretation – not trivial to state 
that some philosopher and especially that Sidgwick did use it. Hence, by refuting the claim 
of the Triviality Charge, I will argue that it is informative and justified to state that Sidgwick 
used the method of reflective equilibrium, even if one takes granted that Singers interpre-
tation of Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics is the correct one or grasps the important methodo-
logical points adequately. 
I Different Interpretations: Sidgwick and Reflective 
Equilibrium 
According to Singer’s interpretation in “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium”, Sidgwick pro-
poses a top-down approach in the realm of normative ethics to justify moral propositions: 
one has to start with self-evident axioms (in the form of universal principles) and to see 
what follows from these. If our everyday moral judgments cohere with the ethical theories 
derived from the axioms, this can be used as an argument to convince common people to 
adopt the justified ethical theories – but this doesn’t show the justification of these theo-
ries, since they themselves are only justified by their status as being inferentially connected 
to the self-evident axioms, which have a privileged epistemic status. Yet, still one can be 
mistaken in holding an apparent axiom to be a real axiom. In terms of Laurence Bonjour 
widely used in epistemology one can call this a moderate foundationalism, where some 
basic beliefs – here the self-evident axioms – are themselves justified without being inferred 
 
1 I am borrwoing the name “Trivility Charge” from Julia Langkau. Langkau argues contra the charge against 
reflective equilibrium in a different (non-moral but epistemic) context and takes a different line of argument, 
though one could say, we share the same strategy. Cf. Langkau 2013. 
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from other beliefs. They can pass on by inference relation the justification to other beliefs 
and this suffices, given that we have true beliefs, that we also have knowledge – in our case 
moral knowledge (cf. Singer 1974, 498-501, 503-5, 507-8; cf. BonJour 1985, 26-30). 
So, according to Singer, the basic beliefs in Sidgwick’s moderate foundationalism are on the 
most abstract level of moral entities: Sidgwick’s basic beliefs concern ultimate ethical prin-
ciples – namely the principle of justice, the principle of prudence and the principle of benev-
olence –from which the morally right theories are deducible. So, in order to choose the right 
moral theory, it is essential to have an intuitive insight in the self-evidence of the axioms 
and to check if the self-evidence was merely apparent self-evidence by reflecting if there 
are any other self-evident axioms that conflict with the one under investigation, if there is 
an consensus on the axioms and if the principles corresponding to the axioms are ambiva-
lent or precise. As I see it, this interpretation of Sidgwick – which I tried to reconstruct here 
in a condensed form – remains Singer’s interpretation and hasn’t changed substantially in 
the other works I will refer to (cf. Singer 1974, 503, 507-8; cf. Sidgwick 1907, Book III, esp. 
Chapter XI, 2, and Chapter XIII).2 
He contrasts this moderate foundationalism in the realm of normative ethics with an inter-
pretation of the method of reflective equilibrium. The basic idea of reflective equilibrium is 
that a theory and our common sense considered judgments should be brought into agree-
ment. And if they both support each other in the best available way the judgments as well 
as the corresponding theory are justified. Both are also open to revision in the process of 
adjustment.  
Although sometimes the method of reflective equilibrium is accused of being a form of dis-
guised common sense-intuitionism – which means that it is a bottom-up moderate founda-
tionalist approach that presupposes that one can do ethics analogue to (some common in-
terpretations of) empirical inquiry or science – mostly it is recognized as a form of 
coherentism, as it is by Singer. Importantly Singer seems to imply that the use of the method 
of reflective equilibrium would result not only in a coherence account of justification but 
also a coherence account of validity or truth (cf. Singer 1974, 492-5, esp. 493-4). 
Rawls, according to Singer, thus misinterprets Sidgwick when he suggests that they share 
the same method of justification. He thinks that this misinterpretation rests on the passages 
where Sidgwick tries to show that the utilitarian theory, which can be derived from the 
 
2 There are, of course, other interpretations: Rawls himself refers to Schneewind 1963. Skelton 2010 backs some 
of the points that lead to a rejection of the claim that Sidgwick used the method of reflective equilibrium, Crisp 
2002 is as well critical on the suggestion that he used this method, but on different grounds, Sverdlik 1985 and 
Brink 1994 have interpretations that would in contrary back the claim of the direct use of the method. 
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principle of benevolence together with the principle of justice, is fitting best to the judgments 
of our common-sense morality But this ad hominem argument – as Singer calls it – (respec-
tively the coherence with our common sense judgments) is not what justifies this axiom (or 
any other). What justifies all possible axioms is, that they are self-evident and remain self-
evident after due reflection. 
Now if the method of reflective equilibrium were to be understood in the way Singer sug-
gested, and one accepts Singer’s interpretation of the Methods of Ethics it would clearly be 
inadequate to state that Sidgwick used the method of reflective equilibrium. Sidgwick, ac-
cording to Singer, would have used a top-down moderate foundationalism and believed in 
objective moral truths, whereas Rawls would have used a coherentist approach, that in-
cludes not only a coherence account for justification but also for truth and thus he would 
be a subjectivist or cultural relativist concerning moral truth, so that their methodology is 
not consistent at all. 
II Singer’s Revised Position 
This brings us to part two of this paper. We can begin by asking the question: Was Singer 
right with this interpretation of reflective equilibrium? Most often reflective equilibrium is 
– as Singer rightly suggested – indeed considered a coherentist method of justification. But 
typically, this involves a form of weak foundationalism, which means that while there are 
no beliefs which themselves are already justified without inferential backing, there are 
some which have an initial credibility, because they are what we in fact believe before we 
start to scrutinize and criticize our system of beliefs. This initial credibility is – according the 
weak foundationalist interpretation of coherentism (which I want to presuppose hence-
forth) – not enough to grant an inquirer knowledge. Justification thus arises only if beliefs – 
initially held or not – can be incorporated in a system of held beliefs in the most coherent 
way such that they are mutually backed by inferential relations better than in any alterna-
tive system of beliefs that one could accept (cf. Rawls 1974, 8). 
But although reflective equilibrium is widely understood as a coherence method of justifi-
cation, that doesn’t mean that a proponent of it must embrace a coherence account of 
truth: There can be objective moral truth that is not created nor secured by a coherent 
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system of moral beliefs even if one thinks that this is what justifies these beliefs.3 Most 
proponents of the method of reflective equilibrium take coherence (combined with initial 
credibility of the beliefs that we actually accept) as a criterion of justification but not the 
criterion of truth and thus admit, contrary to Singers earlier assumption, that there is (moral 
or non-moral) truth or objectivity independent of its subjective justification. 
One of the most detailed accounts of reflective equilibrium originates from Norman Daniels 
(1996). He builds his account on the distinction between a narrow reflective equilibrium 
and a wide reflective equilibrium.4 If one is trying only to achieve a narrow reflective equi-
librium one just tries to achieve coherence only between our considered judgments and 
theories. But according to the method of reflective equilibrium in the wide interpretation – 
which we should use in philosophy – one has to incorporate in the weighing process all 
relevant background theories and arguments. These background theories are scientific or 
philosophic theories or arguments that would have an impact on the narrow reflective equi-
librium, were they to be considered. 
Thus, the method of reflective equilibrium in the wide sense is a method that enables us to 
be critical of our judgments and scrutinize our biased system of belief. It is also wide enough 
for background theories, that mandate for special areas of investigations special sub-meth-
ods. If, for example, a plausible theory casts doubt on our common sense moral judgments, 
it could be possible to discredit these judgments systematically in moral inquiry – just as 
Singer himself holds – with the possible result (if it also can be argued for the remaining 
beliefs to be basic) that one establishes for the realm of normative ethics a moderate foun-
dationalism. In this way, wide reflective equilibrium is indeed compatible with the method 
of Sidgwick the way Singer interpreted it. 
Weak foundationalism – according to this interpretation of reflective equilibrium – remains 
the “default setting” for inquiry unless a different sub-method is vindicated for certain areas 
of investigation. 
Also, Singer himself, who, of course, did follow the debate on reflective equilibrium, now 
explicitly accepts in his 2005 article “Ethics and Intuitionism” and his book The Point of View 
 
3 Indeed, Rawls himself leaves room for the idea that if we use the method of reflective equilibrium it might result 
in a convergence of out ethical belief systems what could indicate that we are getting closer to moral truths. That 
implies on the other hand, that we still can go wrong, even if we have reached a reflective equilibrium. Cf. Rawls 
1974, 9-10, 21. Cf. Daniels 1996, 33-40. 
4 According to Rawls’ terminology in his article “The Independence of Moral Philosophy” (1974) – Rawls suggested 
the use of wide reflective equilibrium already in A Theory of Justice. Cf. Rawls 1971, 49; 1993, 8-9. 
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of the Universe – jointly written with Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek (2014) – that the method 
of wide reflective equilibrium is indeed compatible with Sidgwick’s method.5  
Admittedly, it is possible to interpret the model of reflective equilibrium so that it takes into 
account any grounds for objecting to our intuitions, including those that I have put forward. 
Norman Daniels has argued persuasively for this ‘wide’ interpretation of reflective 
equilibrium. If the interpretation is truly wide enough to countenance the rejection of all our 
ordinary moral beliefs, then I have no objection to it. (Singer 2005, 347)6 
II.a The Triviality Charge 
So, what is stopping us – granted that we do agree with Singer’s Sidgwick interpretation – 
from simply stating that Sidgwick indeed used something like the method of wide reflective 
equilibrium? According to Singer there is a price to be paid, if the method of reflective equi-
librium is understood as wide, as Daniels suggests: 
The price for avoiding the inbuilt conservatism of the narrow interpretation, however, is that 
reflective equilibrium ceases to be a distinctive method of doing normative ethics. Where 
previously there was a contrast between the method of reflective equilibrium and 
‘‘foundationalist” attempts to build an ethical system outward from some indubitable starting 
point, now foundationalism simply becomes the limiting case of a wide reflective equilibrium. 
(Singer 2005, 347) 
Singer claims that if the use of the method of reflective equilibrium is no means anymore 
to distinguish a priori, that some moral philosopher proposes rather a coherentism than a 
moderate foundationalism for ethical inquiries, then stating that the philosopher used the 
method of reflective equilibrium becomes meaningless. It’s just trivial to state, that a phi-
losopher used the method of reflective equilibrium understood in this wide sense, that in-
cludes the possibility of an ethical moderate foundationalism – so to say that Sidgwick used 
the method of reflective equilibrium is pointless and we shouldn’t state pointless utterances 
(at least, this seems to be implied). This is the core of the triviality charge: 
[…] whether wide reflective equilibrium and foundationalism can be distinguished depends on 
the substance of ‘the acceptable moral theory’ and on what the philosophical arguments allow 
us to conclude. Without knowing which moral theory is acceptable and whether there are 
 
5 He accredits the notion of wide reflective equilibrium to Daniels and not to Rawls – and I think he is mistaken 
here, Cf. Singer and de Lazari-Radek 2014, 11-114; cf. Singer 2005, 347. 
6 One could interpret the cited statement in a way that Singer now accepts a weak foundationalism in which certain 
beliefs are epistemically devalued, but I suggest that Singer’s position is still a moderate foundationalism. 
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philosophical arguments that reveal which moral judgments are objectively true, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that, once we have found the soundest moral theory and the best phil-
osophical arguments, we will be able to demonstrate that none, or virtually none, of our ex-
isting moral judgments are credible; such that we can confidently reject all, or virtually all, of 
our current moral judgments, and replace them with the judgments that follow from the 
moral theory. […] In that case, the distinction between wide reflective equilibrium and foun-
dationalism has narrowed to a vanishing point. It would then be true, but trivial, that when 
we do normative ethics, there is no alternative to the method of reflective equilibrium. There 
would be no alternative because wide reflective equilibrium is so wide that it includes all pos-
sible methods, including foundationalism. (Singer and de Lazari-Radek 2014, 112-3)7 
III Arguments against the Triviality Charge 
I will argue that it is not trivial to state that Sidgwick used the method of reflective equilib-
rium (understood as the attempt to achieve a wide reflective equilibrium). 
To support this thesis, I will advance one main argument and two further arguments.  
1. The main argument takes that fallibilism is a necessary condition for being able to 
support the method of reflective equilibrium. Fallibilism is roughly defined here as 
the presupposition that all beliefs without exception which we could use in our phil-
osophical argumentation are in principle questionable and open to scrutiny since the 
epistemic agent cannot be certain of their truth. Why is fallibilism a necessary con-
dition for the method of reflective equilibrium? If there were some beliefs which 
were not open to scrutiny, they would be totally fixed points in the process of ad-
justment when conflicts occur in our system of belief. And everything that could be 
brought in deductive inferential relation with them were as well as fixed (given that 
we accept some set of rules of logic as one of these fixed points). But fixed points are 
not open to weighing considerations if they conflict with other beliefs in a system 
that is to be brought in a reflective equilibrium. All the balancing process that lies at 
the core of the process of achieving reflective equilibrium is only possible if we ac-
cept fallibilism. Yet, fallibilism isn’t the only condition for the method of reflective 
 
7 A similar position is held by Sem de Maagt: “One problem is that by including just about any possible 
disagreement related to the justification of our moral beliefs into its methodology, reflective equilibrium runs the 
risk of becoming vacuous as a method of moral justification, because ultimately reflective equilibrium will simply 
be reduced to reasoning about ethics in general. That is, if any kind of disagreement is included in the search for 
reflective equilibrium it is not evident that it still can function as a method of moral justification.” (2017, 458). 
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equilibrium: A second further necessary condition is a (weak) holistic perspective of 
justification which includes inferential interdependence. A third condition consist in 
criteria of rational belief revision in case of inconsistent beliefs in a holistic system of 
beliefs – namely that a belief succeeds over another conflicting one in the case it has 
(in light of all supportive evidence) a higher degree of credence than the other be-
lief.8 A fourth condition would be the weak foundationalist assumption that all the 
beliefs we think to be true – the “considered judgments” or “commitments” – have 
an initial weak credibility that suffices to distinguish them from merely possible be-
liefs but that is not strong enough for granting us knowledge without further infer-
ential backing.  
But to challenge the triviality charge, I will only rely on fallibilism. 
Now there are, at least, two reasons why it is informative – rather than trivial – to state that 
Sidgwick was a fallibilist: 
i. The first reason is obvious: There are philosophers who are infallibilists and think 
that they have reached some unquestionable truths. Singer himself points to Des-
cartes to illustrate this position from which he wants to distinguish Sidgwick’s posi-
tion. This means obviously that Singer also thinks that pointing to Sidgwick’s fallibil-
ism is informative. In fact, if one wanted to classify that kind of infallibilism that 
Descartes seems to present, one would call it – according to BonJour – strong foun-
dationalism.9 So it is literally false to simply state that foundationalism might be in-
cluded in the method of reflective equilibrium: Some form of foundationalism might 
not be included, which shows us again, that to assign the method of reflective equi-
librium to some someone is informative. Granted – nowadays most philosophers 
seem committed to some sort of fallibilism but there still might be some who argue 
for infallible truths – in ethics as well as in other areas of philosophy. So even with 
the majority of contemporary philosophers being fallibilists it is not completely trivial 
to state that some philosopher is a fallibilist. This already counts for contemporary 
philosophers, but Sidgwick is a historic philosopher, so the claim that he used the 
 
8 This should normally lead to a maximal coherent set of beliefs, what could in itself be counted as another 
condition for reflective equilibrium. 
9 One could argue that Descartes only seems to present a strong foundationalism and if we were to reconstruct his 
position with the principle of charity in mind it would turn out that he too was a fallibilist. This might hold for other 
philosophers as well. If so, the claim that the method of reflective equilibrium is the method of philosophy could 
be true (generally speaking) – I leave this open to further investigation. But even if this were correct, it still would 
be informative to state that these philosophers were fallibilists because one had to debunk their apparent 
infallibilism and theoretically infallibilism would still be an option. 
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method of reflective equilibrium is even more informative and interesting, if we 
rightly can assume that there have been more infallibilists in the past (Crisp 2002, 
60-63). 
ii. The second reason is an exegetic one: In Sidgwick’s Methods the notion of self-evi-
dent axioms plays – as it is well known – a fundamental role. But how is the notion 
of self-evidence understood in Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics? To state that the axi-
oms he proposes are based on a self-evident intuition (plus reflection) but still are 
fallible is an informative interpretation.10 
This is my main argument and I would like to turn to two additional arguments against the 
Triviality Charge 
2. The second argument concerns the meta-level on which the methodological design 
of a subdomain, i.e. certain areas of investigation with specific features, is justified. 
On this meta-level we are operating on coherentist or weak foundationalist stand-
ards even if there is a moderate foundationalist standard (or any other fallible stand-
ard) justified in the sub-domain. A sub-domain could be for example the area of nor-
mative ethics. If one does assume that Sidgwick proposed a moderate foundational 
method for normative ethics but was using a reflective equilibrium to justify this 
method on the meta-level of – let’s say – metaethics, then on this meta-level he was 
arguing in a coherentist or weak foundationalist way. I hold that the same pattern is 
true for externalist epistemologists. Since these claims could be more controversial 
than the precedent, I would like to build upon it only an additional argument against 
the Triviality Charge. Yet I think, it might be the philosophically more interesting 
claim. There seem to be – at least – two non-trivial statements connected with this 
claim: 
i. The arguments by which a moderate foundationalism in a subdomain like nor-
mative ethics is justified are establishing the methodological design of the sub-
domain in the first place and are thus superordinate. In other words, the “default 
position” of inquiry is coherentism or weak foundationalism and a change from 
the default position must be justified and held justified over time in coherentist 
or weak foundationalist terms.  
 
10 Singer himself emphasizes that Sidgwick is a fallibilist: Cf. 1974, 508. 
Sidgwick, Reflective Equilibrium and the Triviality Charge  
256 
ii. It follows then that the methodological design of a subdomain that changed from 
the “default position” is open to ongoing scrutiny in the always dynamic remain-
ing process of the method of reflective equilibrium. To change the method in a 
subdomain is always provisional, as every justification in reflective equilibrium is 
provisional and open to further scrutiny. Trying to achieve a reflective equilib-
rium remains always an ongoing task because there always can be new beliefs – 
for example through new experiences or evidence – that would have to be incor-
porated in the holistic system of beliefs. And there is always the possibility that 
one overlooked relevant background theories or arguments. There could be new 
inconsistencies at any time which we did or could not anticipate, such that trying 
to achieve a reflective equilibrium is an ongoing dynamic process. It seems that 
a perfect reflective equilibrium is a philosophical ideal, but even this ideal state – 
at a certain time – would be provisional. 
If this is all true, then it is clearly non-trivial. 
3. The third argument points to the fact that fallibilism is an ideal as well as an im-
portant attitude in important domains of civil society: for example, in science or in 
the political sphere of liberal democracies. This renders information about the use 
of the method of reflective equilibrium informative and valuable in a social sense – 
it is useful for us as citizens and epistemic agents if it is stressed that an important 
theory is fallibilistic. As this is a claim that must be explained and argued for in in 
detail (which I cannot do extensively here), I consider it only an additional possible 
argument, which I want to point to at the end of my argumentation. 
IV Conclusion 
To conclude: Is it misleading or inadequate to state that Sidgwick used the method of re-
flective equilibrium as his method of justification? Since the method is capable of justifying 
in the realm of ethics coherentism as well as moderate foundationalism, it is at least im-
portant to qualify how Sidgwick used the method exactly: Did he use it to establish a mod-
erate foundationalism for the area of normative ethics with his abstract universal axioms as 
fallible basic beliefs? Or did he treat his axioms merely as provisionally fixed points (like 
Rawls treats the judgment about the injustice of slavery as a provisionally fixed point) but 
not as basic beliefs in the sense that is needed for a moderate foundationalism? To decide 
the correct answer is a goal for experts on Sidwick’s philosophy. So far Singer’s position 
might be vindicated. 
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But the claim that he used the method of reflective equilibrium in general as his method of 
justification gives no preliminary decision to this question and is nevertheless quite informa-
tive.11 
And as Sidgwick wasn’t merely a fallibilist, but also tried to argue in a coherent way for his 
position with respect to personally held judgments, I would say it is also quite safe to sug-
gest that he made use of the method of reflective equilibrium. 
References 
[1] BonJour, Laurence. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, 
MA/London: Harvard University Press. 
[2] Brink, David O. 1994. “Common Sense and First Principles in Sidgwick’s Methods.” 
Social Philosophy and Policy 11 (1): 179-201. 
[3] Crisp, Roger. 2002. “Sidgwick and the Boundaries of Intuitionism.” In Ethical 
Intuitionism: Re-evaluations, edited by Philip Stratton-Lake. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 56-75. 
[4] de Maagt, Sem. 2017. “Reflective equilibrium and moral objectivity.” Inquiry: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (5): 443-65. 
[5] Daniels, Norman. 1996. Justice and Justification, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
[6] Elgin, Catherine. 1996. Considered Judgment, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
[7] Goodman, Nelson. 1955. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
[8] Langkau, Julia. 2013. “The Method of Reflective Equilibrium and Intuitions” In Was 
dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen 
Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie, edited by Miguel Hoeltje, et al. 
University of Duisburg/Essen, 352-64. urn:nbn:de:hbz:464-20130612-081113-3 
[9] Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
11 It would be an interpretative inquiry of its own to determine if this general claim was Rawls’s claim or if he indeed 
interpreted Sidgwick’s epistemology for normative ethics as a form of coherentism and pointed therefore to his 
use of the method of reflective equilibrium. 
Sidgwick, Reflective Equilibrium and the Triviality Charge  
258 
[10] _____. 1974. “The Independence of Moral Theory.” Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association 48: 5-22. 
[11] _____. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
[12] Sidgwick, Henry. 1907. The Methods of Ethics, 7th edition. London: Macmillan and Co. 
[13] Singer, Peter. 1974. “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium” The Monist 58 (3): 490-517. 
[14] _____. 2005. “Ethics and Intuitionism” The Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4): 331–52.  
[15] _____, and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek. 2014. The Point of View of the Universe. Sidgwick 
and Contemporary Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
[16] Skelton, Anthony. 2010. “Henry Sidgwick’s Moral Epistemology” Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 48 (4): 491-519. 
[17] Schneewind, J. B. 1963. “First Principles and Common Sense Morality in Sidgwick’s 
Ethics” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 45 (2): 137-56. 
[18] Sverdlik, Steven. 1985. “Sidgwick’s Methodology” Journal of the History of Philosophy 
23 (4): 537-53. 
















































This volume collects selected papers delivered at the 15th Conference of 
the International Society for Utilitarian Studies, which was held at Karlsru-
he Institute of Technology in July 2018. It includes papers dealing with the 
past, present, and future of utilitarianism – the theory that human happiness 
is the fundamental moral value – as well as on its applications to animal 
ethics, population ethics, and the future of humanity, among other topics.
9 783731 511083
ISBN 978-3-7315-1108-3
Gedruckt auf FSC-zertifiziertem Papier
Michael Schefczyk & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) 
Utility, Progress, and Technology
Proceedings of the 15th Conference of the  
International Society for Utilitarian Studies
Utility, Progress, and Technology 
Proceedings of the 15th Conference of the  
International Society for Utilitarian Studies
edited by
Michael Schefczyk & Christoph Schmidt-Petri 
Print on Demand 2021 – Gedruckt auf FSC-zertifiziertem Papier
ISBN 978-3-7315-1108-3   
DOI 10.5445/KSP/1000134479
This document – excluding parts marked otherwise, the cover, pictures and graphs –  
is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International License  
(CC BY-SA 4.0): https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.en
The cover page is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-No Derivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-ND 4.0):
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/deed.en
Impressum
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)  
KIT Scientific Publishing 
Straße am Forum 2 
D-76131 Karlsruhe
KIT Scientific Publishing is a registered trademark  
of Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.  
Reprint using the book cover is not allowed.
www.ksp.kit.edu




PREFACE .................................................................................................................................. i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................... iii 
Dieter Birnbacher 
UTILITARIANISM AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FUTURE ..................................................... 1 
Thomas L. Carson 
WAS ABRAHAM LINCOLN A UTILITARIAN? .......................................................................... 21 
Gustavo H. Dalaqua 
LIBERTY AS RESISTANCE AGAINST OPPRESSION AND EPISTEMIC  
INJUSTICE IN J. S. MILL ......................................................................................................... 31 
Stephen Engelmann 
PROTAGORAS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND THE ART OF POLITICS:  
J.S. MILL IN THE 1830S ......................................................................................................... 39 
Don A. Habibi 
J.S. MILL ON REBELLION, REVOLUTION AND REFORM ......................................................... 49 
Martin Hähnel 
THE PLACE OF GOOD, GOODNESS AND GOODS WITHIN  
CONSEQUENTIALIST FRAMEWORKS .................................................................................... 59 
Jonas Harney 
ON PARFIT’S WIDE DUAL PERSON-AFFECTING PRINCIPLE ................................................... 69 
Moritz Hildt 
GIVING HEDONISM A SECOND (AND PROPER) CHANCE ...................................................... 79 
Stefan Hofmann 
BRANDT’S RULE UTILITARIANISM AND THE FUTURE. REPLIES TO  
THE DEMANDINGNESS OBJECTION ...................................................................................... 91 
Michihiro Kaino 
BENTHAM’S THEORIES OF THE RULE OF LAW AND  




UTILITARIANISM AND THE ENGLISH POOR LAW REFORM ................................................. 111 
Cheng Li 
SAMUEL ROMILLY AND JEREMY BENTHAM’S DECISIONS OF PUBLICATION ...................... 123 
Fayna Fuentes López 
KILLING ANIMALS: THE BADNESS OF DEATH, VALUE AND REPLACEABILITY ...................... 131 
Christoph Lumer 
FROM UTILITARIANISM TO PRIORITARIANISM .................................................................. 139 
Christoph Lumer 
HOW TO DEFINE ‘PRIORITARIANISM’ AND DISTINGUISH IT  
FROM (MODERATE) EGALITARIANISM ............................................................................... 153 
Susanne Mantel 
THE REASONS OF OBJECTIVE CONSEQUENTIALISM AND COLLECTIVE  
ACTION PROBLEMS ............................................................................................................ 167 
Vincent Emmanuel Mathon 
A SHELL GAME THEORY – RECONNECT MANKIND WITH NATURE  
TO CREATE WEALTH ........................................................................................................... 175 
Ricardo Miguel 
AGAINST ANIMAL REPLACEABILITY: A RESTRICTION ON CONSEQUENCES ........................ 183 
Tim Mulgan 
WHAT EXACTLY IS WRONG WITH HUMAN EXTINCTION? .................................................. 193 
Ryu Okazaki 
HEGELS BEGRIFF DER NÜTZLICHKEIT: ZUM ZUSAMMENHANG VON  
RELIGIONSKRITIK UND TERROR .......................................................................................... 205 
Filimon Peonidis 
JAMES MILL ON OFFENCES COMMITTED BY THE PRESS .................................................... 213 
Ingmar Persson 
PARFIT’S REORIENTATION BETWEEN REASONS AND PERSONS  
AND ON WHAT MATTERS ................................................................................................... 223 
Ingmar Persson 




ABOUT THE BADNESS OF EXISTENCE AND THE PROSPECT OF EXTINCTION ...................... 239 
Michael W. Schmidt 
SIDGWICK, REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND THE TRIVIALITY CHARGE ............................... 247 
Shingo Segawa 
IST DER PERSONENBEGRIFF WIRKLICH ÜBERFLÜSSIG  
FÜR DIE BIOMEDIZINISCHE ETHIK? .................................................................................... 259 
Adam Shriver 
IS HEDONISM A VERSION OF AXIOLOGICAL MONISM? ..................................................... 269 
Koji Tachibana 
NEUROFEEDBACK-BASED MORAL ENHANCEMENT AND MORAL REASON ........................ 283 
Piero Tarantino 
CREATING AN OBLIGATION: BENTHAM AND THE NORMATIVE QUESTION ....................... 293 
Hiroki Ueno 
DOES ADAM SMITH’S MORAL THEORY TRULY DIVERGE  
FROM HUMEAN UTILITARIANISM? .................................................................................... 305 
Satoshi Yamazaki 
PIGOU’S THEORY ON WELFARE ECONOMICS IN THE NARROW AND BROADER  
SENSES: BASED UPON THE INDIRECT UTILITARIAN STRATEGY .......................................... 315 
Alexandra Zinke 
TWO WAYS TO SATISFY (AND NO WAY TO SATISFY UTILITARIANS) .................................. 325 
Panel Discussion 
HARE’S UTILITARIANISM, VARNER’S ANIMALS .................................................................. 335 
Gary Varner 
OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK ................................................................................................... 336 
Alastair Norcross 
ON THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PERSONS, NEAR-PERSONS,  
AND THE MERELY SENTIENT .............................................................................................. 339 
Adam Shriver 




TREATING ANIMALS AS THE SORT OF THING THEY ARE: COMMENTARY ON  
GARY VARNER’S PERSONHOOD, ETHICS, AND ANIMAL COGNITION ................................. 347 
Gary Comstock 
VARNER ON ANIMALS: ROOM FOR FAR-PERSONS? ........................................................... 353 
Gary Varner 
REPLIES TO NORCROSS, SHRIVER, MONSÓ, AND COMSTOCK ........................................... 359 
